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Abstract
Quitting games are multi-player sequential games in which, at ev-
ery stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting.
The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; each
player i then receives a payoﬀ ri
S, which depends on the set S of play-
ers that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoﬀ to each
player is zero.
We exhibit a four-player quitting game, where the “simplest” equi-
librium is periodic with period two. We argue that this implies that all
known methods to prove existence of an equilibrium payoﬀ in multi-
player stochastic games are therefore bound to fail in general, and
provide some geometric intuition for this phenomenon.
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11 Introduction
Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each
player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as
soon as at least one player chooses to quit; the payoﬀ to player i ∈ I is ri
S,
where S ⊆ I is the set of players that did choose to quit at that stage. If the
game never ends, the payoﬀ to each player is 0.
A quitting game is therefore a multi-player stochastic game of the simplest
kind. There is only one history of play that does not lead to termination. A
strategy of player i is a sequence xi = (xi
n)n≥0, where xi
n is the probability
that player i quits at stage n, provided the game has not terminated before.
The strategy x is stationary if xi
n is independent of n.
It is not known whether quitting games have an ε-equilibrium for every
ε > 0. We brieﬂy review existing results.
In the case of two players, stationary ε-equilibria do exist, for every ε >
0. A three-player example was devised by Flesch et al. (1997), with no
stationary ε-equilibrium. In this example there exist equilibrium payoﬀs
in the convex hull of the vectors r{i} ∈ RI, i ∈ I. Moreover, there exist
corresponding ε-equilibrium proﬁles x that are periodic (w.r.t. time) and
such that the mixed move xi
n is arbitrarily close to ci, for every stage n and
every player i.
A complete analysis was provided in Solan (1999), for the more gen-
eral class of three-player absorbing games.1 Solan proved the existence of
(uniform) ε-equilibrium proﬁles, by means of analyzing the limit behavior
of stationary equilibria of a modiﬁed discounted games, when the discount
factor goes to zero. This generalizes the method that was introduced by
Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) for the analysis of two-player absorbing games.
In both of these proofs, the limit proﬁle x is either a stationary equilibrium
or is such that termination occurs with probability zero. In the latter case,
an ε-equilibrium can be deﬁned that plays a perturbation of x. In all other
known existence proofs for multi-player stochastic games, see, e.g., Flesch et
al. (1996), Thuijsman and Raghavan (1997), Solan (2000) or Vieille (2000a,
2000b), close inspection of the proofs reveals a similar dichotomy.
The main purpose of this note is to demonstrate that all these methods
are bound to fail for four-player quitting games - hence for more complex
1An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing state.
2stochastic games with more players. We provide a four-player example, where
there is neither (1) a stationary ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0, nor (2) an
equilibrium payoﬀ in the convex hull of {r{i},i ∈ I}. Actually, the “simplest”
equilibrium in this example is periodic with period 2, in which the probability
of quitting in every stage is bounded away from zero.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a geometric
understanding of what is speciﬁc to two- and three-player games. Next, we
deﬁne the game in Section 3 and prove our claims.
In a companion paper (Solan and Vieille (2001)) we introduced new tools
and provided suﬃcient conditions on the payoﬀs under which quitting games
admit an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
2 Two- and Three-Player Quitting Games
We here consider quitting games with at most three players and discuss the
result below.
Proposition 1 For every ε > 0 and every quitting game with at most three
players, there exists an ε-equilibrium x = (xi
n)i∈I,n∈N such that either x is a
stationary proﬁle or xi
n ≤ ε for every n ∈ N and every i ∈ I.
As discussed in the Introduction, this proposition follows immediately
from Solan (1999). We shall here sketch a geometric proof. We discuss
two-player and three-player games in turn.
We ﬁrst introduce a few notations. We denote by ci and qi the two actions
of player i. We let ai
n be the action played by player i at stage n, denote by
t = inf {n ≥ 1,ai
n = qi for some player i ∈ I} the stage in which the game
terminates, and by St the set of players that choose to quit at that stage.









where Ex stands for the expectation with respect to the probability distribu-
tion induced by x over the set of plays. We let c denote the proﬁle of actions
(ci), and by ci the pure stationary strategy that plays repeatedly ci.
32.1 Two-player quitting games




If there is a pure stationary equilibrium we are done. Otherwise either
a1 > 0 or b2 > 0 (otherwise (c1,c2) is an equilibrium). Assume w.l.o.g. that
a1 > 0. Then a2 < d2 (otherwise (q1,c2) is an equilibrium), which implies
that d1 < b1 (otherwise (q1,q2) is an equilibrium), which implies that b2 < 0
(otherwise (c1,c2) is an equilibrium).
If a2 ≥ b2 then the stationary proﬁle (x1,c2) is an ε-equilibrium, where
x1
n = η, and η ∈ (0,1) is suﬃciently small.
If a2 < b2 then the stationary proﬁle (x1,q2) is an ε-equilibrium, where
x1 is deﬁned as above.
Therefore, any two-player quitting games has a stationary ε-equilibrium.




2.2 Three-player quitting games
We shall only deal with the case where ri
{i} > 0 for each i ∈ I. The discussion
of the other cases does not involve additional ideas.
We normalize the payoﬀs to have ri
{i} = 1 for each i ∈ I. We organize the
discussion according to the conﬁguration of payoﬀs. The diﬀerent cases are
exhaustive, but not mutually exclusive. All strategies are stationary unless
explicitly speciﬁed. For convenience we identify a number x ∈ [0,1] with the
stationary strategy that quits with probability x in every stage.
Given ε ∈ (0,1], set Tε = {x ∈ [0,1]3 |
P3
i=1 xi = ε}, and ∆ε = {x ∈
[0,1]3 |
P3
i=1 xi ≥ ε}. The set ∆ε is a subset of the set of stationary proﬁles.
It contains all proﬁles for which the probability of termination in any given
stage is non-negligible.
4Case 0: There exists ε ∈ (0,1) such that, for every proﬁle x ∈ Tε, there is at
least one player i whose unique best reply to x is qi. We prove that the game
has a stationary equilibrium. The proof is based on a standard ﬁxed-point
argument, applied to the best replies of a constrained game. We let C ∈ R
be an upper bound for all payoﬀs in the game.
For every x ∈ Tε let Ix ⊆ I be the set of players i such that γi(x−i,qi) −
γi(x) > 0. The assumption tells us that Ix is not empty for every x ∈
Tε. Since γi(x) and γi(x−i,qi) are continuous over the compact set Tε, ρ =
minx∈Tε maxi∈Ix {γi(x−i,qi) − γi(x)} > 0.
It follows that there is ε0 > ε such that for every ε1 ∈ [ε,ε0], and every
x ∈ Tε1 there is a player i such that γi(x−i,qi) − γi(x) > ρ/2. Fix ε1 ∈




xi + (ε1 − ε)(γi(x−i,qi) − γi(x)) γi(x−i,qi) ≥ γi(x)
xi(1 + min{1,ρ/4}(ε1 − ε)(γi(x−i,qi) − γi(x))) γi(x−i,qi) < γi(x).





In that case, both players 2 and 3 are at worst indiﬀerent between quitting
alone or waiting for player 1 to quit. The stationary proﬁle ((1 − η)c1 +
ηq1,c2,c3) is an ε-equilibrium, provided η is suﬃciently small.
This analysis remains valid when the roles of the players are permuted.
Case 2 : There is no convex combination α1r{1} + α2r{2} + α3r{3} of the
three vectors (r{1},r{2},r{3}) such that α1r{1} + α2r{2} + α3r{3} ≥ (1,1,1).
By continuity, there is ρ > 0 such that in every convex combination of
r{1}, r{2} and r{3}, at least one player receives at most 1 − ρ. It follows that
for ε > 0 suﬃciently small, the assumption of Case 0 holds. In particular,
there is a stationary equilibrium.
Case 3 : r1
{2},r1
{3} < 1.
One can easily verify that the assumption of Case 1 or Case 2 is satisﬁed.
Case 4: There is a convex combination α1r{1}+α2r{2}+α3r{3} of the three
vectors (r{1},r{2},r{3}) such that α1r{1} + α2r{2} + α3r{3} = (1,1,1).
5The stationary proﬁle ((1 − ηα1)c1 + ηα1q1,(1 − ηα2)c2 + ηα2q2,(1 −
ηα3)c3 + ηα3q3) is an ε-equilibrium, provided η is suﬃciently small.
We next introduce a notational convention. For i 6= j, we shall write
ri
{j} = ‘+0 if ri
{j} ≥ 1 and ri
{j} = ‘−0 if ri
{j} < 1. If neither Case 1 nor Case 3
holds (nor their analogue symmetric cases), the triplet (r{1},r{2},r{3}) ∈ R9 is
either of the form ((1,+,−),(−,1,+),(+,−,1)) or ((1,−,+),(+,1,−),(−,+,1)).
Each of these two situations is reducible to the other by a permutation of
two players. We will proceed under the assumption that
(r{1},r{2},r{3}) is of the form ((1,+,−),(−,1,+),(+,−,1)).
Case 5: There is a convex combination α1r{1}+α2r{2}+α3r{3} of the three
vectors (r{1},r{2},r{3}) such that α1r{1} + α2r{2} + α3r{3} ≥ (1,1,1).
The set of such (α1,α2,α3) is deﬁned by three halfspaces and by the
conditions αi ≥ 0, α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. It is therefore a triangle (possibly
reduced to a singleton).
The vertices of this triangle are labelled A,B,C in such a way that players










































6We write A (resp. B, C) as a convex combination of (1,0,0) and B (resp.
of (0,1,0) and C, of (0,0,1) and A):
A = β1(1,0,0) + (1 − β1)B
B = β2(0,1,0) + (1 − β2)C
C = β3(0,0,1) + (1 − β3)A.
Fix M ∈ N, large enough. Deﬁne a non-stationary proﬁle σ as follows.
Players 1, 2 and 3 (in that order) alternate indeﬁnitely as follows. During
M stages, player i quits with probability
βi
M (while the other two players
continue). Depending on who starts ﬁrst, the payoﬀ induced by σ is close to
the payoﬀ associated with the convex combination A, B or C respectively.
Moreover, the proﬁle σ is an ε-equilibrium of the quitting game.
2.3 Discussion
This geometric construction may help to understand why in general there
need not be neither a stationary ε-equilibrium nor an equilibrium payoﬀ in
the convex hull of {r{i}}i∈I. Assume for simplicity that ri
{i} = 1 for each
player i.
Consider for a moment a three-player game. From each point u ∈ [1,∞)3,
and every i such that ui = 1, draw a small arrow in the direction u−r{i} (the
number of arrows from each u can be 0,1,2 or 3). If there is a ﬁxed point u
(that is, u = r{i} for some player i), then there is a stationary ε-equilibrium,
that corresponds to Case 1 above. If the arrows form a closed path, then
there is a cyclic equilibrium, that corresponds to Case 5 above.















be all vectors in the convex hull co(r{i},i ∈ Iu) such that each player that
takes part in the convex combination receives 1. For every u ∈ [1,∞)3 draw
small arrows in direction u − v, for every v ∈ Vu. Any ﬁxed point (that
is, if u ∈ Vu), correspond to a stationary ε-equilibrium. Any closed path
that is formed by the arrows corresponds to a cyclic ε-equilibrium. More
generally, if there is an open path of inﬁnite length then there is a non-cyclic
7ε-equilibrium. Moreover, if there is an equilibrium payoﬀ in the convex hull
of {r{i}}i∈I, then there is either a ﬁxed point, a closed path, or an open path
with length inﬁnity.
Alas, as the next example shows, there are four-player games in which
there are no ﬁxed points, and all paths are open and have ﬁnite length.
3 The Example

























In this game player 1 chooses a row (top row = continue), player 2 chooses
a column (left column = continue), player 3 chooses either the top two ma-
trices or the bottom two matrices, (top two matrices = continue) and player
4 chooses either the left two matrices or the right two matrices (left two
matrices = continue).
Note that there are the following symmetries in the payoﬀ function: for










where vi(a,b,c,d) is the payoﬀ to i if the action combination is (a,b,c,d)
(vi(c1,c2,c3,c4) = 0).
In Solan and Vieille (2001), it is proven that this game admits a cyclic





where x,z ∈]0,1[ are independent of n; that is, at odd stages players 2 and 4
continue, while 1 and 3 quit with positive probability, whereas at even stages
1 and 3 continue, while 2 and 4 quit with positive probability.
We shall now prove the following:
Proposition 2 The game does not admit a stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For every ε > 0 small enough, the game does not admit an
ε-equilibrium x such that kxn − ck < ε for every n ∈ N.
It follows from Propositions 2 and 3 that the game does not admit a
stationary ε-equilibrium, provided ε is small enough. Indeed, let us argue
by contradiction, and assume that for every ε > 0 there exists a stationary
ε-equilibrium xε. Let x? be an accumulation point of {xε} as ε → 0. If x?
is terminating (x? 6= c) then it is a stationary 0-equilibrium, which is ruled
out by Proposition 2. Otherwise, x? = c, and then, for ε > 0 suﬃciently
small, there is an ε-equilibrium x where k xn −c k< ε, which is ruled out by
Proposition 3.
Proposition 2 is proved in section 3.1, while Proposition 3 is proved in
section 3.2.
3.1 No Stationary Equilibria
We check here that the game has no stationary equilibrium. We organize the
discussion according to the number of players who play both actions with
positive probability.
3.1.1 No non-fully mixed stationary equilibrium
We prove here that there is no stationary equilibrium in which at least one
player plays a pure strategy.
It is immediate to check that there is no stationary equilibrium in which
at least three players play pure stationary strategies.
9We shall now verify that there is no stationary equilibrium where two
players play pure stationary strategies. Using the symmetries in the payoﬀ
function, it is enough to consider the cases where either player 3 and 4 play
pure strategies, or players 2 and 4 play pure strategies.
Assume ﬁrst that there is an equilibrium in which players 3 and 4 play
pure stationary strategies. The strategies of players 1 and 2 form then an
equilibrium of a 2 × 2 game. We will see that these two-player games have
only pure equilibria. The four-player game would thus have an equilibrium
in pure stationary strategies - a contradiction. In the ﬁrst three cases, the
induced game is equivalent to a one-shot game. In the last case, it is a
quitting game.
Case 1: Players 3 and 4 play (q3,q4): the unique equilibrium in the induced
game is (c1,c2).
Case 2: Players 3 and 4 play (c3,q4): the unique equilibrium is (c1,q2).
Case 3: Players 3 and 4 play (q3,c4): symmetric to case 2.
Case 4: Players 3 and 4 play (c3,c4): the unique equilibria are (q1,c2) and
(c1,q2).
We shall now see that there is no stationary equilibrium where players 2
and 4 play pure actions, by analyzing the induced game between players 1
and 3.
Case 1: Players 2 and 4 play (c2,c4): the induced game has a unique equi-
librium (q1,q3).





4q3). Player 2 would receive 5
8, but he would get 1
by playing c2.
Case 3: Players 2 and 4 play (c2,q4): the unique equilibrium is (q1,c3).
Case 4: Players 2 and 4 play (q2,q4): the unique equilibrium is (c1,q3).
Next, we check that there is no stationary equilibrium where one player,
say player 4, plays a pure strategy, and all the other players play a fully mixed
strategy. We denote by (x,y,z) the fully mixed stationary equilibrium in the
three-player game when player 4 plays some pure stationary strategy.
Assume ﬁrst that player 4 plays q4. Then, in order to have player 2
indiﬀerent, we should have
x(1 − z) = z − (1 − x)(1 − z),
which implies that z = 1/2. In order to have player 1 indiﬀerent, we should
10have
(1 − y)z + y(1 − z) = yz − (1 − y)(1 − z),
which solves to yz = 1/2, and therefore y = 1, which is pure.
Assume now that player 4 plays c4. First we note that x < 1/2, otherwise
player 3 prefers to play q3 over c3. Next, if player 2 is indiﬀerent between his
actions, then
(1 − x)(1 + 3z)
1 − xz
= x + (1 − x)z,
or, equivalently,
(1 − x)(1 + 2z + xz
2) = (1 − xz)x.
Since x < 1/2, it follows that 1 − x > x. Therefore it follows that
1 + 2z + xz
2 < 1 − xz,
which is clearly false.
3.1.2 No fully mixed stationary equilibrium
We prove now that there is no fully mixed stationary equilibrium. We shall
ﬁrst write the best-reply conditions. Next, we shall check that these can not
be satisﬁed simultaneously.
We focus on player 1. Let (y,z,t) ∈ (0,1)3 be a given fully mixed proﬁle
of players 2, 3 and 4.
By playing c1 at stage 1 and the mixed action x ∈ (0,1) in all subsequent
stages, player 1’s expected payoﬀ is
α(y,z,t) := yzt(γ
1(x,y,z,t) − 2) − 2yz + 3zt − yt + y + z.
On the other hand, by playing q1 at stage 1, player 1’s expected payoﬀ is
β(y,z,t) := t + (1 − t)(y + z − 1).
If x ∈ (0,1) is a stationary best reply to (y,z,t), the two payoﬀs are equal,
and equal to γ1(x,y,z,t):
α(y,z,t) = β(y,z,t) = γ
1(x,y,z,t).
11In particular, the polynomial ∆1 that is deﬁned by
∆1(y,z,t) := α(β(y,z,t);y,z,t) − β(y,z,t)
vanishes at (y,z,t). Observe that facing (y,z,t), the stationary strategy c1
yields a payoﬀ in [0,1]. Deﬁning ∆2(x,z,t),∆3(x,y,t) and ∆4(x,y,z) in a
symmetric way, we have thus proved the next result.
Lemma 4 If (x,y,z,t) ∈ (0,1)4 is a fully mixed stationary equilibrium, then,
for every i = 1,2,3,4, one has ∆i(x,y,z,t) = 0 and γi(x,y,z,t) ∈ [0,1].
We shall prove (see Lemmas 6, 7 and 8 below) that there is no (x,y,z,t) ∈
(0,1)4 such that (i) y = min{x,y,z,t},(ii) ∆1(y,z,t) = ∆4(x,y,z) = 0 and
(iii) γ1(x,y,z,t),γ4(x,y,z,t) ∈ [0,1]. By symmetry, condition (i) is w.l.o.g.
By Lemma 4, this will therefore imply that the game has no fully mixed
stationary equilibrium.
For simplicity of notations we sometimes omit the arguments in β.
Lemma 5 ∆1(t,t,t) > 0 for every t ∈ [0,1].
Proof. t 7→ ∆1(t,t,t) is a polynomial in one variable. The result follows
by using any method for counting the number of zeroes of a polynomial in a
compact interval, e.g. Sturm’s method.
We state a useful observation.
Fact 1 β is separately increasing on the set {y ≤ min{z,t}}.
Fact 2 ∆1 is decreasing in y and increasing in z on the set {y ≤ min{z,t}}.
The proofs of the Fact 1 and the ﬁrst assertion in Fact 2 are obtained
by elementary algebraic manipulations, and are therefore omitted. For the
second assertion in Fact 2, observe that ∂∆1
∂z is decreasing in y. Since y ≤ t,
this yields ∂∆1
∂z (y,z,t) ≥ ∂∆1
∂z (t,z,t) = (β − 2)t2 + t2z(1 − t) + 2t > 0.
Lemma 6 ∆1 > 0 on the set {y ≤ t ≤ z}.
Proof. By Fact 2 , ∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(t,t,t) > 0 if y ≤ t ≤ z.
12Lemma 7 ∆4 > 0 on the set {y ≤ z ≤ 1
2} ∩ {γ4 ≥ 0}.
Proof. Indeed, if γ4 ≥ 0, one has
∆4(x,y,z) ≥ −2xyz − 2xz + 4xy + 1 − 2y = y(−2xz + 4x − 2) + 1 − 2xz.
Denote by fx,z(y) the aﬃne function in y that appears in the right-hand side.
Since fx,z(0) = 1 − 2xz > 0 and fx,z(z) = (1 − 2z) + 2xz(1 − z) > 0, it is
positive on {y ≤ z ≤ 1
2}.
Lemma 8 ∆1 > 0 on the set {max{y, 1
2} ≤ z ≤ t}.
Proof. We split the discussion into several steps.
Step 1: ∆1 > 0 on
n
y < 1
2 ≤ z ≤ t}
o
.




2 + β t
4 > 0.
Step 2: ∆1 > 0 on {1
2 ≤ y ≤ z ≤ t ≤ 2
3}.
Indeed, by Fact 2, ∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(z,z,t). We prove below that ∆1(z,z,t)
is decreasing in z. This will imply ∆1(z,z,t) ≥ ∆1(t,t,t) > 0, hence the
claim.





{∆1(z,z,t)} = 2z(β − 2) + 2zt(2 − y − z) + 2z
2(1 − t) − 2z
2t + 4.
Therefore, ∂




















The right-hand side in (1) is decreasing in z. It is therefore maximal for z = 1
2.
It is then equal to 2
3(β−1)+1





Step 3: ∆1 > 0 on {1
2 ≤ y < 2
3 ≤ z ≤ t}.

































Step 4: ∆1 > 0 on
n
2
3 ≤ y ≤ z ≤ t
o
.




= (β − 2)yz + yzt(2 − y − z) + 4z − 2 ≥ (β − 2)yz + 4z − 2. (2)
The right-hand side of (2) is increasing in z. Therefore, it is minimal when
z = y, hence at least −5
4y2+4y−2. This latter expression is itself minimized
at y = 2
3 where it equals 1
9. Thus, ∆1 is increasing in t. By Fact 2, this
implies ∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(z,z,z) > 0.
Step 5: ∆1 > 0 on {1
2 ≤ y ≤ z ≤ 2
3 ≤ t}.
By Facts 1 and 2, β(y,z,t) ≥ 2






2 + 4zt + 1 − 2t. (3)
Let f be the function deﬁned by the right-hand side of (3), and t ≥ 2
3. The




















it is positive on [1/2,2/3].
3.2 No perturbed ε-equilibrium
We ﬁrst present a sketch of the proof. The proof goes by contradiction. Let
x = (xn) be an ε-equilibrium such that kxn − ck < ε for each n. Since each
14player gets 1 when quitting alone, the probability that the game terminates
in ﬁnite time is close to one. Moreover, since xn is close to c, the quitting
coalition is a singleton with high probability. In particular, the sum of the
payoﬀs of all four players under x is close to 5. Hence, at least one player
gets a payoﬀ substantially higher than 1 under x, while no player receives a
payoﬀ that is much below one. There is no convex combination of r1, r2 and
r3 which satisﬁes these conditions. Therefore, the probability that player 4
belongs to the quitting coalition is bounded away from zero. By symmetry,
the same holds for each player i ∈ I.
Next, we claim that there is no such ε-equilibrium that gives to players
1 and 2 (or 3 and 4) a payoﬀ substantially higher than one. Indeed, assume
such an equilibrium were to exist. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, both players
1 and 2 would choose to continue with very high probability, since the payoﬀ
obtained by quitting is approximately 1. Moreover, by the ε-equilibrium
property, they will do so in every stage n such that their expected payoﬀ,
starting from stage n, is higher than one, unless the probability that the game
reaches stage n is close to zero. Therefore, as long as their continuation payoﬀ
exceeds 1 and the probability of surviving is not too small, players 1 and 2 will
not contribute to the quitting coalition. However, as long as players 1 and 2
do not contribute, their continuation payoﬀ increases. Indeed, the expected
payoﬀ starting from today is a weighted average of the payoﬀ received if
someone quits today and of the expected payoﬀ starting from tomorrow.
Since the payoﬀ to players 1 and 2 is below one if only player 3 or 4 quits,
the expected payoﬀ starting from tomorrow must exceed the continuation
payoﬀ starting from today.
Assume now that player 1 - but not player 2 - gets a payoﬀ substantially
higher than 1, and let n1 be the ﬁrst stage such that the continuation payoﬀ
of player 1 is close to one. Since the continuation payoﬀ of player 1 decreases
between stages 1 and n1, the probability that player 2 quits before stage
n1 is non-negligible. Since player 1 hardly contributes to the probability of
quitting before stage n1, the continuation payoﬀs of player 2 do not decrease
over time up to stage n1. Since player 2 quits with non-negligible probability,
his continuation payoﬀs must remain close to one for a while. In particular,
players 3 and 4 should not quit in those stages. This implies that the contin-
uation payoﬀs of player 3 and 4 increase in these stages. After a while (stage
n1 at the latest), both continuation payoﬀs of players 3 and 4 are higher than
one, a situation that has been ruled out above.
15We now proceed to the formal proof. We let ρ = 8 be twice the maximal
payoﬀ in absolute value, and N = 4 be the number of players.
It is convenient to assume that, in any given stage, at most one player
quits with positive probability. This assumption entails no loss of generality,
as shown by the next lemma.
Lemma 9 Let ε ≤ 1/8 and let x be an ε-equilibrium such that kxn − ck < ε
for every n. Then there exists a 12Nρε-equilibrium y such that, for every
n ∈ N, kyn − ck < ε and |{i ∈ I,yj
n > 0}| ≤ 1.
Proof. We deﬁne y by dividing each stage into four substages, and by
letting each player quit in turn with the probability speciﬁed by x. Formally,






n if i = j
0 if i 6= j .
We ﬁrst compare the payoﬀ vectors under the two proﬁles x and y.
Plainly,





n) = Px(t > n | t > n−1) for every n ∈ N.
Observe next that, for each j ∈ I,
























The denominator is at least 1−4ε ≥ 1/2, hence the diﬀerence between these
two probabilities is at most 2ε.
By summation over n, this yields
|Px(St = {i}|t < +∞) − Py(St = {i}|t < +∞)| ≤ 2ε. (4)
Under y, no two players quit simultaneously with positive probability,
therefore
P
i∈I Py (St = {i}|t < +∞) = 1. Using (4), it follows that Px(|St| >
1|t < +∞) ≤ 2Nε.
16Since kγ(x)−γ(y)k ≤ ρ
P
S⊆I |Px(St = S) − Py(St = S)|, one gets
kγ(x)−γ(y)k ≤ 4Nρε. (5)
Next, we prove that player i has no pure proﬁtable deviation from yi.
Consider ﬁrst the strategy ci. The above argument does not rely on the
ε-equilibrium property of x and applies to any proﬁle x such that kxn −
ck ≤ ε for every n ∈ N. When applied to the proﬁle (x−i,ci), it yields  
γi(x−i,ci) − γi(y−i,ci)
 






i(y) + ε + 8Nρε.
Consider next the strategy qi
(n−1)N+k that quits at stage (n − 1)N + k
and continues before that stage. We compare the payoﬀs to player i under
the two proﬁles (y−i,qi
(n−1)N+k) and (x−i,qi
n). When mimicking the above
argument, one obtains
Py−i,qi
(n−1)N+k(t ≤ (n − 1)N) = Px−i,qi





















St|t > (n − 1)N
i
− 1| ≤ (N − 1)ρε + ρε, where
(N − 1)ρε accounts for the probability that someone may quit in the ﬁrst
k−1 substages of stage n, and ρε accounts for the probability that some player




St|t > (n − 1)
i
− 1| ≤












This concludes the proof.
We henceforth assume that x is an ε-equilibrium such that |{i ∈ I,xn > 0}| ≤
1 and kxn − ck < ε for every n ∈ N. We refer to such a proﬁle as a perturbed
ε-equilibrium.
Lemma 10 For every perturbed ε-equilibrium x one has
1. Px(t < +∞) ≥ 1 − ε.
172. γi(x) ≥ 1 − ρε − ε for every i ∈ I, and γi(x) ≥ 5
4 − 2ε for some i ∈ I.
3. Px(St = {i}) ≥ 2
15 − ρε for every i ∈ I.
Proof. Given n ∈ N, let yi,n be the strategy of player i that coincides
with xi in the ﬁrst n stages and plays qi at stage n + 1. The sequence of
payoﬀs (γi(x−i,yi,n))n∈N converges to γi(x) + Px(t = +∞), as n goes to
inﬁnity. Since γi(x−i,yi,n) ≤ γi(x) + ε for every n, claim 1 follows.
By quitting at the ﬁrst stage, player i obtains at least 1 − ρε. The ﬁrst
part of claim 2 follows. Whenever the quitting set is a singleton the payoﬀs




i(x) =5Px(t < +∞) ≥ 5 − 5ε.
In particular, there exists i such that γi(x) ≥ 5
4 − 5
4ε. The second part of
claim 2 follows.





and that analogous identities hold for players 2, 3 and 4. In particular, by
claim 2, one has
p
1 + 4p
2 ≥ 1 − 2ρε and 4p
1 + p
2 ≥ 1 − 2ρε,
which implies p1 +p2 ≥ 2
5 − 4
5ρε. By exchanging the roles of the players, one
gets p3 + p4 ≥ 2
5 − ρε. Therefore, p1 + p2 ≤ 3
5 + ρε. Thus, (p1,p2) satisfy
p
1 + 4p
2 ≥ 1 − 2ρε, 4p
1 + p






Any solution to the system (6) satisﬁes p1,p2 ≥ 2
15 − ρε.
Given a proﬁle x, a player i ∈ I, and a stage n ∈ N, we let xi(n) be the
strategy which plays ci up to stage n, and coincides with xi after stage n.
We denote by xn = (xn,xn+1,...) the proﬁle induced by x in the subgame
starting from stage n. Finally, we let pi
n : = Px(t < n,St = {i}). Note that
pi = limn→∞ pi
n. Though pi
n depends on the proﬁle, this is not made explicit
in the notation.
We prove now that, as long as the continuation payoﬀ of player i exceeds
1, player i’s contribution to the probability of termination is small.
18Lemma 11 Let x be a perturbed ε-equilibrium. Assume that γi(xn) ≥ 1+
√
ε









n, for every n ≤ n0.




Proof. We proceed by induction. Assume n = 1. If xi
1 = 0, then
xi(1) = xi and pi
1 = 0, and the result holds. Otherwise, pi




























Assume now that 1 < n ≤ n0. If xi
n = 0, then xi(n) = xi(n − 1) and
pi
n = pi


















and the result holds.
If xi








































We say that players 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4) are partners. The partner of
player i is denoted by ˜ ı.
We next prove that, whenever player i gets a payoﬀ higher than one in
a perturbed ε-equilibrium, player i will not contribute to the probability of
termination, while the partner of i will contribute, until a stage is reached in
which the continuation payoﬀ of player i is close to one.
19Lemma 12 Let a > 0, ε ∈ (0,1/900) and i ∈ I. Let x be a perturbed ε-
equilibrium such that γi(y) ≥ 1 + a. Then there exists n1 > 1 such that (i)





ε, and (iii) 3p˜ ı
n1 ≥ a −
√
ε.
Proof. For convenience, assume i = 1. Since p1 ≥ 2/15 − 3ε, by Lemma
11, there is a stage n such that γ1(xn) < 1 +
√
ε. Let n1 = inf{n ∈
N,γ1(xn) < 1 +
√
ε} be the ﬁrst such stage. Note that n1 > 1. By def-
inition, claim (i) holds and γ1(xn) ≥ 1 +
√








n1 ≤ ε, claim (ii)
follows.
We now prove (iii). Since γ1(xn1) < 1 +
√
ε one has
































We next prove that there is perturbed ε-equilibrium in which two partners
get a payoﬀ substantially higher than one.
Corollary 13 Let ε ∈ (0,1/900) and a > 9
√
ε. There is no perturbed ε-
equilibrium x such that
γ
i(x),γ
˜ ı(x) ≥ 1 + a for some i ∈ I.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Let x be such a perturbed ε-equilibrium,
and assume w.l.o.g. i = 1. Apply Lemma 12 twice, to players 1 and 2. Call
n1 and n2 the corresponding two stages, and assume w.l.o.g that n1 ≤ n2,
so that p2
n1 ≤ p2
n2. Thus, one has both p2










ε — a contradiction.
We now proceed to the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let ε > 0 be small enough, and let x be a
perturbed ε-equilibrium. We assume w.l.o.g. that γ1(x) ≥ 5/4−2ε. We will
exhibit a stage n2 such that xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium, and γ3(xn2),γ4(xn2) ≥
1 + 1/12, contradicting Corollary 13.









ε. By Lemma 11, there exists a stage
n ≤ n1 with γ2(xn) < 1 +
√
ε. We set
n2 = max{n ≤ n1,γ







ε, and p1 ≥ 2
15 − ρε, one obtains
Px(t < n2) ≤ 1 − P(t ≥ n2 and St = {1}) ≤
13
15






Since x is an ε-equilibrium, xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium.




ε. If n2 = n1 there is nothing
to prove. Assume n2 < n1, so that γ2(xn1) > 1+
√
ε. By the deﬁnition of n2,
γ2(xk) > 1+
√
ε for every n2 < k ≤ n1. Apply Lemma 11 with y = xn2 (thus
yk = xn2+k, for each k) and n = n1 − n2. Since xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium, the














We use this result to prove that γ3(xn2),γ4(xn2) ≥ 1+1/12. As previously,
one has























from (7) that p3
n2 + p4
n2 ≤ (7 + 2ρε)
√
ε + 4ρε ≤ 8
√
ε.
On the other hand,

















n2 ≥ 1/12 − 17
√
ε, (8) yields γ3(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1
11 − ε1/4 ≥ 1 +
1/12. Similarly, γ4(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1
12. Since xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium, we get a
contradiction to Lemma 13.
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